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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Sheila Penrose Larsen Land, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
William Dennis Land, 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
) 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
No. 16238 
This is an action based.upon an Order modifying a 
Decree of Divorce previously entered between Plaintiff 
and Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOw~R COURT 
Defendant's Order to Show Cause for Modification 
was denied. Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was eranted 
in hearing tried before the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks an Order affirming the 
decision of the lower court and denying Defendant-Appellant's 
Appeal. 
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STATD!ENT OF FACTS 
The Decree of Divorce granted between the parties 
was based upon stipulation. The Decree provides in per-
tinent part the following: 
"2. The Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody 
and control of the three minor children of the 
parties, and shall be awarded the sum of One 
Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per month per child in 
child support for a total of Three Hundred Dollars 
($300.00) per month. This child support shall 
be increased to One Hundred Thirty Three Dollars 
($1.33.00) per month per child upon Defendant's 
payment in full of t~e second mortgage on the home 
of the parties." ( R- 23) 
"7. The Defendant is awarded the business known 
as the Eat'n House located in Salt Lake City, Utah 
and shall have full ownership of all assets and 
full responsibility for all debts arising therefrom. ( R-24 
"6. The Defendant shall assu..'1le and pay all debts 
and obligations incurred by the parties up to and 
including the 29th day of October, 1974 and shall 
defend and hold the Plaintiff harnless for the pay-
ment of the same except those specifically mentioned 
herein including the obligation under the first 
mortgage on the hor:le of the parties." (R-24) 
"8. Plaintiff is awarded the home and real property 
of the parties located at 5171 South 2870 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah subject to an interest 
of Defendant who is awarded a 50 percent interest 
in the present equity in the home which value 
shall be fixed not later than January 1, 1975. 
Defendant's interest in the home shall be an obli-
gation against the property only upon Plaintiff's 
sale of the home or upon the youngest surviving 
child of the parties reaching the age of majority 
or becoming emancipated, whichever occurs first. 
Payment of Defendant's interest shall be made at 
the time of receipt of funds on any sale of the 
property or within two years following the date 
of majority or emancioation of the yolin,,-est 
surviving child of the parties. Defend~nt's 50 
percent. interest shall bear interest at 3 percent 
per annum from January 1, 1975 until paid. (R-24) 
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"? · The ~~aintiff shall assune as her sole obliga-
tion the_~irst mortgage on the home and shall make 
the required payments on that mort3age. The Defen-
dant shall assume as his sole obligation the second 
mortgage on t~~ home and shall make the required 
payments on tnis mortgage until paid in full. (R-24) 
The Findings of Fact and Convlusions of Law and the 
Decree of Divorce specifically incorporatedthe terms of the 
Stipulation si8ned by the parties and indicated that the 
terms of the Decree of Divorce sfoul.d be construed in accor-
dance with said Stipultaion. (R-21,25) The provisions in the 
Decree were essentially the same as those in the Stipulat~on. 
Defendant-Appellant received as his sole property all 
of the business assets acquired by the parties during the 
marriage, to wit: the "Eat'n House". Defendant was also 
required to be solely responsible for all of the debts and 
obligations incurred as a direct result of the operation of 
that business. Defendant incicated he was cognizant and aware 
of those provisions. (R-81) Numerous judgments and liens 
incurred by the operation of subject business and having been 
duly recorded, attached to the real property of the parties 
prior to the entry of the Divorce Decree. The amount of 
these liens was approximately $27,000.00. (R-77) Defendant 
was to pay all business indebtedneW'!i as well as the second 
mort3age on the residence. \Vhen Defendant had paid off the second 
rnortia~e. his child support obligations were to be increased from 
-3-
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One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per month per child to One 
Hundred and Thirty Three Dollars ($133.00) per month per 
child. (R- 23) 
There is a disputed issue of fact as to whether the amount 
of these liens or encumbrances has been reduced substantially 
at the present time or whether the total liens attaching to 
the property, as a result of the operation of the business, is 
approximately the same. Plaintiff testified that in 1976 
there were still $27,000.00 worth of recorded liens. (R-94) 
Defendant-Appellant testified that he has paid off personal 
liens and liens against the house in the amount of apuroxi-
mately $9,000.00, and that some of these were liens against 
the property. (R-82) Defendant insisted that he had received 
satisfactions of judgment on some of the judgments.(R-82) 
Defendant in August of 1978 filed his Motion to Reduce 
Child Support Obligations from $133.00 per month per child 
to $100.00 per month per child (R-28), a total attempted re-
duction of $99.00 per month because of three children bein~ 
born as issue of the marriage. Plaintiff then filed her Motior 
Requesting that Child Support Remain the Same, but requesting 
that Defendant be required to pay one-half (1/2) of any medical 
and dental insurance coverage on the children (R-34), an issue 
not provided for in the Decree. Plaintiff also asked 
that Defendant be required to Quit Claim any interest he 
had in subject premises to Plaintiff due to the fact that 
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at the time specified in the Decree there was no equity 
in the home. (R-34) Plaintiff's Affidavit filed at that 
time indicated that the appraised value of the residence, 
at the time of the Decree, was approximately $52,000.00. 
That the mortgages at the time were approximately $25,000.00, 
and the other liens and encumbrances were in the amount of 
$27,000.00, thus leaving no equity in which Defendant could 
share. (R-37) 
After the Court heard evidence on the matter the Court 
took the matter under advisement and then entered its 
minute entry dated November 16, 1978. (R-41) That Order 
was then supplemented by Findings of Facts, Conclusions 
of Law and a Formal Order Nodifying the Decree of Divorce. 
(R-41-50) That Order ~=ovided that an appraisal of the resi-
dence be made as of January 1, 1975, to determine the value 
of the residence at that time. The Order also provided 
that equity at that time was to be deternined by taking 
the value as of that date and subtracting all liens, 
mortgages and encumbrances. Plaintiff was then to pay to 
Defendant SO percent of that equity in return for Defendant 
executing a Quit Claim Deed. (R-50) Defendant's Motion 
to reduce child support was denied, and Plaintiff's Motion 
requesting Defendant to pay one-half (1/2) of any medical 
and dental insurance for the minor children was granted. 
(R-49,50) 
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ARGUHENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT WAS COR..J:\.ECT IN RULING THAT EOUITY IN 
THE HOME SHOULD BE DETEID1INED BY SUBTRiCTIHG FROM 
THE MARKET VALUE ALL LIENS, JUDGHENTS, l10RTGAGES 
OR ENCUMBRANCES AS OF THE DATE OF THE DECREE 
A. PLAINTIFF SUBMITS THAT THE PLAIN CLEA ... ~ AND COMHON 
MEANING OF EQUITY IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE HOLDING OF 
THE COURT. 
Defendant argues that equity should be determined by 
only subtracting from the market value the mortgages on 
the home and not taking into consideration the other liens 
or encumbrances. (p.4,5 of Defendant's Brief) Plaintiff 
submits that it is common usage in the area of real property 
and customary that "equity" in a house and real property 
can only be seen to b~ the amount in excess of all obli-
gations, liens or encumbrances on the property. Financial 
and lending institutions, as well as title companies, 
adopt this definition as their basic premise in the trans-
fer, borrowing or trading of real property. This definition 
is in such common usage that any citation of authorities 
appears unnecessary. Funk and Wai:;nall's Standard Compre-
hensive Interntaional Dictionary, on page 429 of the 
Bicentennial Edition states: "Equity - 4. Value in excess 
of mortgage or other liens." 
Defendant appears to supplement his argument by 
arguing that because Defendant was required to pay off the 
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liens, these should not be taken into account in the deter-
mination of equity. Plaintiff submits that it is undisputed 
that all of the liens, other than the t mar gages, were incurred 
through the operation of the business the "Eat'n House"; and 
that Plaintiff relinquished any claim to any of the assets 
of that business. Plaintiff was required to pay off as her 
sole personal obligation the large first mortgage on the 
home; and Defendant received a reduction of child support 
payments during the time he was paying off the relatively 
small second mortgage. (R-81) The parties agreed that this 
was a fair, reasonable and equitable arrangement and that 
stipulation was adopted by the Court at the time of the 
Decree. 
The Court in its ruling adequately enforced the terms 
of the Decree. The amount,, if any, Defendant has actually 
paid in regard to satisfying these judgments is innnaterial 
to the determination of the amount of equity in the home at 
the time of the Decree. 
B . OTHER COURTS HA VE RULED THAT THE DEFINITION OF EQUITY 
ADOPTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT IS CORP-ECT AHD THAT DEFINITION-
SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
It has been unifornly held that Equity is determined 
to be the amount in excess of all liens or encumbrances. 
The Supreme Court of Florida in Pierson v. Ball, 189 So679, 
138 Fla. 104, (1939), stated: 
" 'Equity' or 'equity of redemption,' in legal 
oarlance refers to a mortgagor's right to redeem 
. ' 
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after forfeiture for nonpayment of mortgage but 
before sale by sheriff, but in common acceptation 
has reference to value of porperty in excess of 
incumbrances that amount to a lien." 
The Iowa Supreme Court in Des Hoines Joint Stock Land Bank 
of De;Mot·nes v. Allen, 261 N. W. 912,220 Iowa, 448,(1935), 
stated: 
"Term 'equity' means the remaining interest be-
longing to one who has pledged or mortgaged his 
property, or the surplus of value which may re-
main after the property has been disposed of for 
the satisfaction of liens. An 'equity' is de-
fined as the amount or value of a property 
above the total liens or charges." 
The Supreme Court of California adopted this definition in 
Comstock v. Fiorella, 67 Cal. Rptr. 104,107, 260 C.A. 2d 
262(196~by stating: 
" 'Equity' is the amount or value of a property 
above the liens and charges." 
There appears to be little doubt the definition adopted 
by the District Court is in accordance with the definition 
adopted by other courts and should be affirmed. 
C. THE DIVORCE DECREE BASED UPON THE STIPULATION OF THE 
PARTIES MAKES IT CLEAR THAT ANY INCREASED VALUE IN THE 
RESIDENCE IN QUESTION IS TO GO TO THE PL<\.H1TIFF. 
Plaintiff agrees with Defendant that the Court has 
the power to apply equity in all divorce stiuations. The 
question of what is equitable in this situation would 
necessarily need to look to the totality of the fact 
situation. Defendant received all assets of the business 
and consequently it would be in conformance with equity 
-8-
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that he should pay all obligations associated with those 
assets. This was stipulated to and approved by the Court. 
Plaintiff was required to pay off the larae first mortcrage 
0 b 
and was to receive only One Dollar ($1.00) per year as 
alimony. Defendant's obligation in regard to the house was 
to pay the small second mortcage, during which time he 
received a reduction in child support. All liens were 
business liens and it appears that equity would dictate 
his paying off said liens. 
Defendant argues that aw~rding the Defendant a 50 
percent interest in the real property would be a meaningless 
gesture if the District Courts definition were to be up-
held. (p. 6 of Defendant's Brief) Plaintiff submits that 
the Defendant was not granted 50 percent interest in the 
real property, but only a "50 percent interest in the 
present equity". (R-24) It is obvious that an appraisal 
would ~1ave to be done to make that determination. The 
District Court in the most recent hearing has ordered that 
appraisal. 
It is clear that Defendant is attempting to gain a 50 
percent interest in the increased value of the residence. 
If, in fact, there was no equity at the time of the Decree, 
then his interest could not attach. To allow Defendant 
SO percent interest in any increased value would not only be 
inequitable but would go against the provision of the 
stipulation which reads in pertinent part: 
-9-
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"6. . ......... Any increase in equity in the home 
and real property after the fixing of the interests 
described herein shall accrue to the benefit of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant shall have no ri3hts over 
any such increase." (R-17) 
The Decree of Divorce does not contain the above cited 
language, but as Plaintiff has indicated in the statement of 
facts, the Findin~s of Facts, Conclusions of Law and the 
Decree of Divorce indicate the intention to incorporate 
this Stipulation and to construe the Decree according to 
its provisions. 
Plaintiff submits that the Court correctly ruled on 
this issue and its Order should be affirmed. 
POINT THO 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW A i!ATERIAL CHANGE IN CIR-
CUMSTANCES THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A REDUCTION OF CHILD 
SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS 
The Court correctly ruled that Defendant's Motion to 
Reduce Child Support should be denied. This Court has 
set the standard to be applied in attempts to modify the 
provisions of the Divorce Decree. It is necessary that 
the moving party show both: 
(1) A material and permanent change in circumstances 
since the entry of the Divorce; and 
(2) That because of that change the original Decree 
is no longer equitable or just. 
In the case of Buzzo v. Buzzo, 45 U. 625, 148 P. 
362, explained in 2 U. (2d) 49, 269 P.2d 284(1915) this Courc 
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held: 
"Up~n applicat~on of either party, court may change, 
modify, or revise a decree respecting maintenance 
whene~er it is satisfactorily made to appear that' 
the circumstances and conditions of the oarties 
or any o~ them, have change so that amou~t originally 
allowed is no longer just or equitable." 
In Carson v. Carson 87 U. 1, 47 P.2d 894 (1935) this court stated: 
Party to a divorce oroceedin~ is not entitled to a 
modification of a decree of divorce in absence of 
showing that there has been material and permanent 
chan3e of conditions since entry of the decree." 
It has consistently been held by this Court that this 
standard is to be applied in modification proceedings. 
Defendant in the case before the Court failed to meet 
either one of the requirements that would allow a modifi-
cation His Motion was based upon the fact that the rental 
on his business had increased from $924.00 per month to 
$1,516.00 per month. (R-29) Detendant estimated that his 
business had increased 10 to 15 percent (R-69). Defendant 
admitted that child support payments and other personal 
expenses were paid out of his business checking account (R.71). 
Defendant admitted that he closes his business for a two 
week period in the surrnner. (R-73) 
Defendant listed numerous items on his Affidavit as 
expenses. One of those payments was $195.00 to Rocky Mountain 
State Bank for a truck.(R-30) At the hearing Defendant 
admitted that this was, in fact,an 18 foot motor home not 
used as a business vehicle, but as a pleasure vehicle. 
(R-76) Defendant listed a monthly payment of $100.00 to 
-11-
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his mother- in- law. (R-30) This obligation was incurred in 
1972 (R-74), but it was stipulated at the time of the hearin0 
that only four (4) or five (5) payments have been made at 
the present.(R-103) Defendant can hardly allege that he 
has made monthly payments in this matter. 
Defendant admitted that his economic situation had 
improved subsequent to the entry of the Decree due to 
the fact that he had paid off numerous debts and obligations.(R: 
Plaintiff submits that by Defendant's Ovlil testimony 
he failed to show a material change in circumstance which 
would have justified a modification. Plaintiff's Affidavit 
revealed that she has monthly obligations of $1,021.42; 
and has a gross monthly income of $825.00 per month and a 
net income of $600.00. (R-36) Plaintiff's Affidavit further 
shows that this calculation does not take into consideration 
many other items and expenses for the children and does not 
include any recreational amounts. (R-37) 
Plaintiff submits that Defendant's attempt to modify the 
Decree is based mainly on rising inflation and costs and the 
record clearly shows that both parties have suffered from 
this problem. Not only has Defendant failed to show a 
permanent material change, but he has also failed to show 
that a change is necessitated under the just and equitable 
standard. 
In Divorce Modification cases this Court has ruled in 
the case of Anderson v. Anderson, 104 U, 138 P.2d 252(1943) that 
-12-
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"The Supreme Court will modify the trial court's 
decree only when there is abuse of its discretion 
and the award is not legally sound." 
Both parties were allowed to present evidence of their 
current financial situation; the District Court was fully 
advised and the ruling of that Court was based on sound 
legal reasoning. 
Plaintiff submits that the District Court's ruling 
should be affirmed. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DEFENDANT SHOULD PAY 
50 PERCENT OF THE COSTS OF MEDICAL AND DENTAL INSUR-
ANCE FOR THE CHILDREN. 
The Decree of Divorce made no mention of the insurance 
coverage for the minor children. Plaintiff testified that 
two of the r::iinor children are in need of braces on their 
teeth at an expense of approximately $1300.00 per child. 
(R-89) She testified that the children are in need of 
psychotherapy and that she cannot afford these treatments. 
(R 89-90) 
It is apparent that the children should have insurance 
coverage. It is also apparent from the record that they are 
not covered by either parent at the present time. The 
need for therapy session and extensive dental treatment 
shows a material change of circumstances that would justify 
a modification and protection for the children is just and 
equitable. Plaintif£ is merely asking that Defendant pay 
one-half (1/2) of this insurance cost. Plaintiff's Affidavit 
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indicates that at this point in time such coverage will 
cost $52.00 per month; so Defendant's obligation would 
only increase a total of $26. 00 monthly. (R-43) 
Under the standards set forth by this Court in Plaintiff's 
Point Two, as well as the facts of this case, the decision 
of the District Court should be affirmed. 
Cat1CLUSION 
The District Court properly considered all factors 
and the Order was based upon standards set forth by this 
Court. The Order of the District Court should be affirmed 
in all aspects, in order to conform to sound legal principals 
as well as justice and equity. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
l'J»Lc n1~ 
Neils E. Mortenson 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
-14-
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-2666 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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